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BEGINNER'S RESOLVE: AN ESSAY ON
COLLABORATION, CLINICAL
INNOVATION, AND THE FIRST-YEAR
CORE CURRICULUM
MARGARET M. RUSSELL*
[T]ry to love the questions themselves like locked rooms and like
books that are written in a very foreign tongue .... Live the questions now.... Resolve to be always beginning - to be a beginner.
...

Rainer Maria Rilke'
I.

INTRODUCrION

This is both an exciting and daunting time to begin a career in the
legal academy. As one who started teaching law in the fall of 1990, I
still view the profession very much through a beginner's critical eyes. I
trust that this confession comes as no surprise, since my more seasoned colleagues have informed me that they felt like greenhorns.well
into their first half-dozen or so years of teaching, and more than a few
have confided that they experience the neophyte's exhilaration and
dread whenever they teach a course for the first time. Accordingly,
beginners of all ages and levels of experience might find wisdom as
well as solace in Rilke's admonition; learning to live (if not always
love) "the questions themselves" is certainly the best way that I have
found to temper the apprentice's angst with a necessary measure of
enjoyment while riding the steep and occasionally heady professorial
learning curve.
But even aside from the conventional "beginner's syndrome," the
novice law teacher of today has special cause for intellectual vertigo in
embarking upon a profession which is itself undergoing a period of
intensive scrutiny and dissection from both without and within. 2 In
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. Special thanks to Santa Clara
University law students Rhonda Andrew ('94) and John Kennedy ('94) for their fine research assistance.
I John J. L. Mood, RILKE ON LOVE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES: TRANSLATIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS OF RAINER MARIA RILKE 25 (1975) ("Rilke's Letters on Love").

2 The inauguration of the journal in which this essay appears is but one manifestation
of this phenomenon. Another is the widespread debate elicited by such recent provocative
critiques of the efficacy of legal education in the training of lawyers as the so-called "MacCrate Report" [formally known as the ABA TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND. THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP-

MENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992)], and the Honorable Harry T. Edwards'
companion essays, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-

fession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992), and The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Educa-
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numerous contexts, the "center" no longer holds when we scrutinize
previously sacrosanct jurisprudential norms and pedagogical assumptions. In a recent essay, Professor Gary Minda describes this dislocation as part of the broader "canon wars" throughout academia:
The canon debate has revealed that there is no longer a consensus
on the possibility of a comprehensive theory for explaining the nature of law. The existence of an ultimate method for yielding correct answers has been put in question, and multiculturalism in legal
once dominant hold of large-scale, totalizing
studies has shaken the
3
law.
of
explanations
To the extent that law is still a "traditional discipline" at all, it is
increasingly rich with interdisciplinary cross-currents and open to untraditional possibilities. 4 Even if he or she wished, a new law professor could scarcely manage to remain ignorant of the vigorous
disputation in academic journals and conferences concerning the influence on legal thought of clinical theory, feminism, law and economics, critical race theory, and other burgeoning fields of scholarship.
No less mainstream an organization than the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) has weighed in with its contribution; in 1993, its
annual conference focused on the question, "Multiculturalism and the
Law: Do We Have a Legal Canon?", noting: "The time has come for
the law teaching profession to begin consideration of the opportunities for exploring the relationship between culture and law."'5 Against
the basically conservative backdrop of legal educational traditions,
even such a cautiously-stated proposition may seem radical indeed in
its implications for future directions in legal theory, doctrine, scholarship, pedagogy, practice, and, in fact, the notion of "law" itself. While
there are still ample grounds to believe that change in legal education
tion and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 2191 (1993). For further
examples of the ongoing debate about the future of legal education, see Symposium on
Legal Education. 91 MIcH.L. REv. 2191 (1993); Symposium on Civic and Legal Education,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1525 (1993).
3 Gary Minda, Jurisprudenceat Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 28-29 (1993).
4 As an illustration of the former development, note the growing number of both interdisciplinary law reviews (e.g., the Yale Journal of Law and Humanities) and interdisciplinary symposia [e.g., Reweaving the Seamless Web: InterdisciplinaryPerspectives on the
Law, 27 Lov. L. REV. 1 (1993)]. Moreover, law schools are increasingly recognizing the
merits of interdisciplinary specialization through the addition of cross-listed courses to
their curricula, and even through the appointment of non-lawyers to their faculties.
5 AALS Annual Meeting Program, Multiculturalism and the Law: Do We Have a
Legal Canon? 71 (San Francisco, Jan. 5-9, 1993). Four of the five papers presented at this
session were later reprinted under the title "Do We Have A Legal Canon?" in 43 J.LEGAL
EDUC. 1-26 (1993). See Derrick A. Bell, Introduction,id. at 1-3; Patricia Nelson Limerick,
The Canon Debate from a Historian'sPerspective, id. at 4-10; Stanley Fish, Not of an Age,
But for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism,id. at 11-21; Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of
Liberal Education, id. at 22-26.
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occurs at a glacial pace, it is also true that never before has the American law school been so strongly and seriously poised for true diversification and transformation.
Yet, for the rookie law teacher, all this boundless "newness" can
often seem more of a bane than a boon. Innovation, for all its shiny
potential, holds a certain amount of peril as well, particularly in light
of the law professor's ethical obligations to prepare students for the
legal world beyond the rarefied atmosphere of the classroom, the
casebook, and the pages of law reviews. Quite simply, how does one
begin to train students in a discipline without rigid boundaries? How
does one thoughtfully, rigorously, and conscientiously prepare them
for a profession which is both yoked to convention and beckoned to
metamorphosis? Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the beginning
law teacher in this regard is the lack of consensus among one's own
colleagues about how best to achieve these objectives. If the legal system indeed suffers from and needs to ameliorate what Judge Edwards
has persuasively described as the "growing disjunction between legal
education and the legal profession,"'6 we as law teachers might productively begin to question and to attempt to bridge the underlying
disjunctions in the legal academy itself. Judge Edwards broadly identifies one such sundering as that between "traditional," doctrinal
scholars and "impractical," theory-oriented scholars. As a nonclinical, doctrinally-oriented teacher with a more than abiding interest
in clinical, feminist, and critical race theory, I view the underlying
philosophical and political disunities as even thornier than those decried in Edwards' article.
In my view, the nature of "The Divide" - or "Divides" - in the
academy concerning the path to truly effective pedagogy is not (or
need not be) bipolar, nor need solutions necessarily be viewed as
wholly contradictory. Perhaps, as the MacCrate Report suggests in
defining a "continuum" rather than a "gap" between legal education
and professional development, many bridges remain unbuilt between
6 See generally Edwards, supra note 2. Edwards' article has served as the catalyst for
much of the current debate; he notes:
I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite directions. The
schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that
judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The firms should be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an ethical manner. But many law schools - espehave abandoned their proper place, by
cially the so-called "elite" ones emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.
Many law firms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else.
While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving toward pure
commerce, and the middle ground - ethical practice - has been deserted by both.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
supra note 2, at 34.
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the so-called "practical" domains of doctrine and skills-training, and
the so-called "impractical" world of "pure theory." Without such
bridges - between clinicians and non-clinicians, theorists and practitioners, doctrinalists and anti-foundationalists - law teachers rapidly
become pigeonholed "specialists" of the worst kind. Their "specialization" relies not on the intellectual strength and promise of what they
do know, but rather on their inability or unwillingness to connect that
expertise to substantive areas and methodologies with which they are
unfamiliar. The ultimate losers in such a scenario are, of course, our
students, who are left to piece together an already fragmented and
imperfect course of study with the disconsolate thought that, in the
end, their teachers neither grasp nor even particularly care about attempting to make the fragments approach a coherent, complementary
whole.
In this essay, I urge my fellow law teachers, especially other nonclinicians, to resist the seductive elitism of such self-segregation and to
consider ways in which our classroom teaching might derive enormous
benefit from cross-fertilization with theories and methodologies from
across the various "Divides" of our legal educational landscapes. As a
primary example of such productive synthesis, I discuss several ways
in which clinical teaching and scholarship have contributed to the diversification of the first-year core curriculum with issues pertaining to
race, gender, class, sexual orientation, disability, age and other forms
of systemic discrimination. As a beginning law teacher of heavily doctrinal core courses (a first-year course in civil procedure and two upper-class courses in constitutional law), I perceive the positive
influence of clinicians in much of what goes on in many so-called
"traditional" doctrinal classrooms. Moreover, I see the potential for
further concrete innovations through the work of clinical scholars who
are beginning to probe the insights which feminist, critical race, and
other theories might bring to the practice of law.
Accordingly, this essay is divided into three parts. In the next
section, I briefly outline the major practical deficiencies of a wholly
"traditional" doctrinal approach, as well as the benefits to be gained
from the examination of diversity issues in first-year required subjects.
In this section, I also identify several key contributions of clinical
work to the diversification of first-year classroom teaching. In part
III, I describe a structural curricular innovation from my own teaching
experience which has proven to be especially conducive to the introduction of diversity concerns: a two-year experimental "coordinated
curriculum" which involves the instructors of all first-year required
courses (for one of three sections -of the entering class) in collaborative efforts to integrate issues of cultural diversity into substantive,
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doctrinal course coverage. In addition to pointing out several "clinicinfluenced" aspects of this curriculum, I recommend additional links
which might be forged between clinical and non-clinical approaches to
first-year education, and suggest ways to address the potential pitfalls
of such integration. Finally, I encourage both non-clinicians and clinicians to consider their teaching efforts as a joint enterprise, one which
can productively draw from theory, doctrine, and skills-training in the
first-year education of reflective and effective lawyers.
II.

TEACHING WITHIN AND BEYOND THE CASEBOOK: THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF CLINICAL APPROACHES To THE
DIVERSIFICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL FIRSTYEAR CURRICULUM

A.

Cultural Diversity, The Limits Of Doctrine, And "Learning To
Think Like A Lawyer"

The question of what it means to raise issues of "difference" and
"diversity" in the classroom is still, after at least a half-dozen years of
the so-called "multiculturalism" debate, both plaintive in its simplicity
and boundless in perplexity. On an abstract level, it is of course impossible to identify with precision exactly what "difference" means in
our legal culture; 7 pragmatically speaking, recent scholarship in lawyering theory helps focus attention in this regard by identifying class,
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and age as salient
factors for analysis.8 In first-year doctrinal courses as well as in the
clinical curriculum, these analytic categories are hardly random
choices, but rather represent significant historical and political axes
along which power has been and continues to be allocated in our legal
system. As such, they are neither marginal, "boutique-ish," nor provisional concerns in the law school curriculum of the 1990s and beyond.
Quite simply, they serve as vitally important explanatory factors in
helping students to comprehend legal structures rooted in prejudice as
well as reason, and to draw upon lived experience as well as doctrinal
analysis.
7 For thoughtful explorations of this theme, see KENNETH KARST. BELONGING TO
AMERICA: THE CONSTITUTION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY (1989); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,

EXCLUSION, AND

AMERICAN LAW

(1990);

IRIS

YOUNG. JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).

8 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Raising PersonalIdentification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993). One might also add "religion" to this list, both in recognition
of the history of invidious discrimination against religious minorities, the unreligious, and
the anti-religious, and because of mainstream society's ambivalent stance toward devout
religious belief itself. On the latter phenomenon, see STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF (1993).
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At this point, the "traditional" first-year doctrinal teacher might
very well dubiously inquire: even if issues of diversity "belong" generally in the law school curriculum, how can they be incorporated into
an already densely-packed required course such as contracts, torts,
civil procedure, property, or criminal law? After all, one might argue,
the purpose of first-year courses is to convey to students not political
science or sociology, but rather a rigorous structure for "learning to
think like a lawyer." How does sustained attention to issues of diversity contribute to that pedagogical objective?
I offer three observations in partial rejoinder. First, although the
definition of what it means to "think like a lawyer" is itself multifaceted and subject to divergent interpretations, it certainly involves
at the very least a finely-honed ability to discern omissions as well as
inclusions, and the implicit as well as the obvious. The expert legal
thinker learns almost reflexively to ask about and consider all aspects
of a problem before accepting the limitations of precedent, form, and
procedure. Yet, unfortunately, most of us do not encourage students
to develop these skills in the context of critiquing the narrowness of
perspectives reflected in many first-year casebooks and other course
materials. As a result, students who think and feel, sometimes desperately, that their first-year courses are sorely lacking in depth and context wind up feeling estranged from rather than competent at the task
of "thinking like a lawyer," when in fact they may be doing so in pertinent, fertile, and innovative ways.
Consider, for example, the following reflections of a group of ten
students who enrolled as first-year students at Stanford Law School
during the 1989-90 academic year. Committed to a serious intellectual
pursuit of the study of law yet extremely disenchanted with the typical
content and format of required first-year courses, these students
formed a reading and discussion group in the second semester of their
first year to assess the deficiencies of an education bound exclusively
"within the casebook." The result of their efforts, Beyond the
Casebook, was a supplementary reader of critical (including clinical)
scholarship on topics related to first-year required courses. 9 In its
preface, the students describe the stifling experience of learning doctrine without reference to broader social, political, and theoretical
contexts:
Most law professors will tell you that the principal objective of
the first semester curriculum is to teach you something called "legal
reasoning." Many of them will probably also acknowledge that this
9 Stanford First-Year Curriculum Project, Beyond the Casebook (1990) (draft copy on

file with the author).
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can be a disorienting and alienating experience. They will suggest
that you should struggle to hang on to your principles and hang on
to what you think you know about the world. Notwithstanding this
advice, your classes and casebooks are not likely to support you in
this effort. When you read a case, don't bother to think broadly
about what might explain the outcome; concentrate on the logic of
the reasoning presented by the judge. Doctrine is what matters....
Many of us found it degrading to suspend our knowledge about the
world. We think legal doctrine is much easier to understand if you
acknowledge and understand the limits of doctrine in explaining the
legal world and the outcomes of cases. 10

I raise the student-inspired example of the Beyond the Casebook
project not only as a critique of the shortcomings of a solely doctrinal
approach to first-year courses, but also as an illustration of a kind of
interdisciplinary, "big picture" type of thinking which is a critical part
of "learning to think like a lawyer."" Through their candid diagnosis
of what they perceived to be a woefully deficient presentation of "The
Law," and their creative construction of a workable remedy, 12 these
students provided a striking demonstration of why the incorporation
of diversity issues into first-year core courses is not only a feasible but
3
also an integrally important part of an effective legal education.'
A second and related reason why cultural diversity should be of
central importance in today's law school curriculum lies in the effect
which the increasingly prevalent influence of diverse perspectives
outside the academy is likely to have on future directions in legal doc14
trine, analysis, and policy. Regardless of ideological predisposition,
"Introduction: What Is This Book and Where Did It Come From?", in id. at 4.
11 For a discussion of the value of interdisciplinary, contextualized thinking and the
"big picture" or "meta" perspective, see generally Peggy C. Davis, Law and Lawyering:
Legal Studies with an Interactive Focus, 37 N.Y. LAW ScH. L. REV. 185 (1992).
12 In fact, the Curriculum Project members were persuasive enough in their critique to
convince their law school to distribute copies of their reader, in the 1990-91 academic year,
to all members of the first-year class as part of orientation materials.
13 More recently, a growing number of law professors have recognized and acted upon
this insight as well. The Society of American Law Teachers (SALT), for example, held two
teaching conferences in 1993 on the subject of "Re-Imagining the Traditional Law School
Curriculum: Integrating Race, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Class, Disability and Other Issues of Social Concern Into Our Core Courses." Both conferences - one held at the New
York University Law School, the other at the Santa Clara University School of Law were very successful, each drawing over two hundred attendees. (Conference materials on
file with the author.) Other organizations, such as the Interuniversity Consortium on Poverty Law and the Poverty Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS), have also devoted significant attention to this topic.
14 Of course, thanks to the strident generalities invoked by the derisive appellation of
"P.C." (or "Political Correctness") in recent popular discourse, many efforts at innovation
in this regard have been distilled into one nasty specter - that of the tyrannical left-wing
teacher who substitutes radical ideology for "The Law" and brooks no resistance in the
classroom. Robert Bork, for example, describes the nation's law schools as controlled by a
10
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the teacher of even the most "mainstream" of first-year courses in the
1990s faces a growing body of jurisprudence which, in my view, simply
cannot be taught thoughtfully and analytically without reference to
the impact of "outsider" perspectives, experiences and scholarship on
the formulation of its underlying concerns. Examples of such areas of
jurisprudence include: the development of sexual and racial harassment law (which is or could be readily made a part of a standard

course in torts);' 5 the meaning and enforceability of surrogacy or
other untraditional parenting agreements (contracts); 16 the efficacy of
an implied warranty of habitability in ensuring an adequate supply of
standard housing (property);' 7 the evolving definitions of "consent" in
rape cases (criminal law); 18 and the proposed expansion of federal

subject matter jurisdiction to include cases in which certain genderbased offenses are alleged (civil procedure). 1 9 Surely, if "learning to
think like a lawyer" connotes acquiring basic literacy of and facility
with significant and sophisticated modes of legal analysis, law schools
should endeavor to provide students with the fundamental "skills"
knowledge necessary to think critically about the function of subordination on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, class, age, and
disability.20
"left-wing orthodoxy which advocates a centralized and uniform society.... These law
schools have graduated a generation of lawyers without teaching them the constitutional
traditions established by our Founding Fathers." Fundraising Letter from Robert H. Bork
on behalf of The Federalist Society, September 4. 1993, at 1-2 (copy on file with the author).
Reading Bork's dire diagnosis of the academic armageddon at hand, one might very
well wonder why, to paraphrase Gil Scott Heron's famed recording from the 1960's, the
revolution has not already been legalized, if not televised, as a result of such relentless and
radical ideology. At the very least, such hyperbole accords far more credit than could
possibly be due to progressive law professors' (or indeed any law professors') influence on
the most recent generation of lawyers.
15 For provocative recent work on sexual harassment and tort doctrine, see Cynthia G.
Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARv. L. REV.
517 (1993). Regarding the use of tort law to address racial harassment, see Richard Delgado. Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
16 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 Loy.
L. REV. 258-59 (1993) (discussing In re Baby M. and surrogacy contracts). On feminist
theory and contract law, see also Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
17 See Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income
Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987).
18 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Laws, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992).
19 See Judith Resnik, Revising the Canon: Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1993).
20 On the need for multicultural legal literacy, see TONI MASSARO, CONSTIrUTIONAL
LITERACY:

A

CORE CURRICULUM FOR A MULTICULTURAL NATION
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Finally, teaching students that they are supposed to be "learning

to think like a lawyer" is little more than a mindless incantation unless
one further specifies exactly what kind of lawyer students are being
encouraged to emulate. In this regard, the concept of context is again
essential, for students can scarcely be expected to match their cognitive habits with those of a "Lawyer in the Abstract." Rather, they
must be challenged to consider both the role of the legal profession in
alleviating the problems of human beings, and the fallibility of the

profession and of lawyers themselves in achieving such an elusive and
noble goal. Far too infrequently, in the first year or indeed throughout their schooling, are law students invited to engage in sustained

discussion of what kind of professional they and their instructors think
a lawyer should be. Such inquiries need to be addressed regularly, in
first-year doctrinal courses as well as in professional responsibility/
21
ethics offerings and public service internships.

B.

First-Year Core Courses And The Influence Of Clinical
Methodologies

The foregoing discussion addressed, in the context of the firstyear core curriculum, several reasons why complex issues of diversity
should be addressed in classroom teaching. Such considerations,
while far from settled among non-clinicians, perhaps seem obvious to
clinical teachers. To the latter community, the question is not whether
but how best to accomplish these goals given the myriad objectives of
clinical education. As a teacher solely of non-clinical courses and primarily of courses regarded as "traditional" and doctrinal, I have discerned positive influences of clinical teaching and scholarship in my
own work in the classroom. In my view, the use of clinical tenets and
methodologies in core courses can enable students to synthesize the
abstract and the concrete in ways which reinforce their understanding
22
of the applicability of "blackletter law" to everyday legal practice.
21 For an illustration of the first-year curricular possibilities for such discussion, see
Richard Boldt, Marc Feldman, Homer C. La Rue, Barbara Bezdek & Theresa Glennon,
Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and Responsibility: A Pedagogical Colloquy, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1107-86 (1992).
22 Of course, concerns about the ineffectiveness of mainstream legal education are
hardly unique to the 1990s. The Legal Realists of a half-century ago, for example, offered
critiques of similar urgency and depth. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools,
56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Jerome Frank, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 907 (1933); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL
EDuC. 211 (1948); Karl N. Llewelyn, On What is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935). Rather, I believe that the current debate represents the
next major paradigmatic shift in legal education and in the process could bring to fruition
many of the ideas originally proffered in Legal Realism criticism. On the contemporary
significance of the Legal Realist movement, see Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
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Such synthesis is especially vital to the success of education in the
first-year, when even the most gung-ho of 1L "true believers" are
chagrined to discover the extent to which discussions of lawyering are
devalued in - if not wholly omitted from - classroom discussion. In
the hope that other teachers of core courses will be encouraged to
experiment with the application of clinical concepts to their own work,
I identify several which I have found to be illuminating, particularly in
helping to introduce issues of diversity into classroom discussion.
One promising possibility for hybridization is the considerable
body of clinical scholarship on the importance of attention to client
narrative, voice, and autonomy in both the identification of legal issues and the formulation of legal strategies. 23 To a great degree, the
traditional doctrinal first-year course reflects a "top-down" approach
to the examination of lawsuits and judicial opinions. The voluminous
compendium of cases known as the typical first-year casebook focuses
nearly exclusively upon judicial outcomes, often at the appellate level.
In relentless and occasionally numbing fashion, students plow through
case after case in their first year, learning to adopt as their primary
locus of analysis the reported judicial opinion. From such a vantage
point, students tend to forget (sometimes, with the teacher's acquiescence if not approval) the human problems which originally gave rise
to the legal dispute described in the text. Certainly, especially at the
beginning of their formal legal training, students need to steep themselves as much as possible in modes of analytical thought and argumentation which are often counterintuitive to previously learned
methods of interpersonal problem-solving. However, first-year
courses would do well also to expose students to the layers of complex
motivations, biases, and values involved in the practice of law. These
areas, too, involve "learning to think like a lawyer" and cannot be
divorced from the study of decisions.
I do not advocate the rejection of doctrine, casebooks, and
"blackletter law" as a solution to this pedagogical narrowing of students' perceptions and abilities. In a core first-year course, the need to
develop doctrinal literacy and analytical competence is of paramount
importance and should not be eclipsed by other objectives. Yet,
surely there are compatibilities among these disparate approaches
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467 (1988) (review of LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:
1920-1960 (1986)).
23 See, e.g., Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative,100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The CriticalPracticeand Theory of Receiving and Translating
Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).

HeinOnline -- 1 Clinical L. Rev. 144 1994-1995

Spring 1994]

Clinical Innovation & 1st-Year Curriculum

which might be developed so as to reduce the sterility of classroom
discussion about hypothetical postulates and litigants, while at the
same time demonstrating to students the relevance of such concepts to
the lawyer-client relationship.
Recent clinical literature about client narratives may assist in this
enterprise by identifying a "bottom-up" approach to the construction
of cases, the study of which can fill in the analytical gaps of a wholly
"top-down" analysis of reported decisions. This clinical method can
be used to remind students of the centrality of concrete, context-specific, individual human stories to the eruption of a legal dispute. Thus,
Phyllis Goldfarb urges teachers to "examine how shifting the focus to
the multidimensional world of law-in-operation might affect one's insights and explanations of legal phenomena. ' 24 Clinical literature offers a number of ways to accomplish this goal in the context of a
traditional course. For example, in civil procedure, more time might
productively be spent examining the pre-pleading and pleading stages
of a lawsuit from a client's perspective in order to explore the extent
to which lawyers can. intentionally or unwittingly filter client prerogatives and needs through their own professional objectives. 25 Quasiclinical materials chronicling the progress of one lawsuit from initial
client interview through trial can afford the opportunity to teach students "blackletter" concepts such as discovery and summary judgment
in the context of a rich factual record of lawyer-client interactions,
drafting exercises, and mock oral arguments. Even old traditional
chestnuts such as Pennoyer v. Neff and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
might be rendered more comprehensible as doctrinal benchmarks if
taught not only in the context of judicial philosophy, but also with
reference to a pragmatic, client-centered consideration of the vagaries
of personal jurisdiction and forum selection. The potential for infusion of clinical methodologies in this regard is not simply the lumpsum addition of practitioner "war stories" to otherwise doctrinal
courses; rather, the subtlety and variety of clinical scholarship on client narrative reveals an abiding concern with developing a more reflective framework for the discussion of the political, moral, and
ethical dimensions of client representation. First-year students in civil
procedure (or any other core course, for that matter) stand to benefit

24 Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical
Legal Theory,'43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 731 (1992) (expanding upon Jerome Frank's observation that teaching the law predominantly through the study of appellate cases is analogous
to teaching horticulture through the study of cut flowers).
25 On the pitfalls of inattention to client autonomy, see generally GERALD R. LOPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Alfieri, supra note 23; White, supra note 23.
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greatly from early and regular exposure to such practice-oriented issues.
Once sensitized to the problematic nature of the lawyer-client relationship and "the law-in-operation," students in doctrinal courses
have a much more pragmatic - and perhaps therefore less "loaded"
applied context for the examination of issues of race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, disability, and age diversity. Just as the attempt to
teach doctrine in the abstract often fails to reach and inspire students,
so too does the effort to teach "diversity" as an abstract concept. In
fact, I have discovered (not particularly to my surprise) that raising
diversity issues in the absence of clinical method oftens strikes students as awkward, preachy, and even treacly; students may rightly perceive it as yet another example of a hollow, "top-down" approach to
pedagogy. Instead, when students are asked not to "Consider Diversity," but to live it by bringing their personal identities to an engaged
discussion or role-play of a lawyer-client relationship, they are reminded that judicial opinions are not themselves "cases," but rather
lenses through which vast human complexities are filtered and at least
temporarily reconciled. In my view, the supplementation of doctrinal
literacy with the critical analysis of diversity issues neither breeds cynicism about "blackletter" law nor insufficiently respects its influence.
On the contrary, the most dispirited comments I hear about the traditional first-year curriculum come from students who are given few opportunities to discuss such "real-world" concerns.
A second area of potential clinical contribution to traditional
classroom teaching lies in ongoing clinical efforts to examine the interrelationship of theory and practice in the teaching of law students. In
this endeavor, clinicians have reached beyond the notion of the mere
"application" of theory to practice toward an organic, integrative ideal
in which connections between theory and practice are viewed as more
closely intertwined and symbiotic. Examples of such work may be
found in the writings of scholar-practitioners who identify and explore
unifying themes between their own tested notions Of lawyering and
critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist theory. 26 These
writings explicitly advance a critical project in which the academy is
urged not to compartmentalize legal thought into "doing theory" or
"doing practice," and in which students are taught the importance of
both in formulating a framework for analyzing their professional development. In addition, clinicians have been increasingly outspoken
in challenging and critiquing the work of both non-clinical critical the26 See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992);
Goldfarb, supra note 24; Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992).
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orists and clinical scholars in light of the core clinical commitment to
train practitioners effectively and realistically. 27 In my view, one of
the most promising directions for future growth in the area of feminist
and critical race legal scholarship lies in clinical work which insistently
aims to probe the practical everyday significance of such theory by
asking: How can these ideas assist in bettering the situation of real
clients? How can they be used to teach effective lawyering skills to
students, particularly aspiring practitioners who may be justifiably
wary and weary of abstractions with no apparent relevance to concrete legal problems? How do they explain the underpinnings of legal
doctrine in a way which could enlighten, engage, and persuade the
decisionmakers (judges, legislators, administrators) whose acts profoundly affect the lives of clients?
Through the use of clinical scholarship which raises these theory/
practice "dilemmas,"
teachers of first-year doctrinal courses have
rich opportunities for the ready introduction of diversity issues into
the mainstream curriculum. Moreover, conscious attention to and explicit identification of the conflicts raised by clinicians in such articles
provide an early context for first-year students to articulate their own
responses to the possible ethical, political and moral contradictions of
client representation. Law students, especially in their first year of
studies, may wonder (quite understandably) about the pertinence of
both doctrine and anti-doctrinal grand theory if these concepts are
introduced in a context devoid of experiential reflection. Clinical work
can explain much in this regard about the relevance of both to the
practice of law.
III.

FURTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR INTEGRATION:

A

"COORDINATED" FIRST-YEAR CURRICULUM

In the past several years, a growing number of law teachers and
law schools have implemented innovative strategies for reforming the
first-year curriculum in ways similar to those described above.2 9
27 See, e.g., Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practicein Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1194 (1992) ("A more morally emphatic, living scholarship is

needed to fill the gap between theory and practice.").
28 For a compelling story of one such "dilemma," see Ruth Colker, The Practice/Theory
Dilemma: Personal Reflections on the Louisiana Abortion Case, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1195

(1992), which literally illustrates the potential convergence of theoretical and practice-oriented perspectives by appending the author's amicus brief in an abortion case to an explanatory essay about the difficulties in ensuring authenticity of client participation in that
brief.
29 At the January 1993 conference of the Association of.American Law Schools, the
Poverty Law Section sponsored a session on "Teaching About Poverty and Class in Traditional Courses" which drew a large and enthusiastic audience. A similarly successful session on the same theme was held at the January 1994 AALS convention. See CONSORTING:
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These efforts owe a tremendous debt to the insights and skills of clinicians who have persistently tried to bridge the "Divide" between their
own work and those of "mainstream" teachers, even in the face of the
fairly pervasive marginalization of clinics and clinical methodologies
from the core curriculum of many American law schools. As a result
of such experiments, teachers of non-clinical courses now stand in a
position to explore possibilities for cross-fertilization not only within
one particular first-year course, but across courses as well. This section addresses one such experiment from my own experience, the
first-year "Coordinated Curriculum" at the Santa Clara University
School of Law.
Santa Clara University School of Law is in the second year of a
"Coordinated Curriculum" project which was approved by the faculty
in the spring of 1992 for a two-year preliminary experimentation period. Two first-year small sections (approximately seventy students, or
one-third of the entering class) participate in a year-long sequence of
courses which consists of the following first-year subjects: civil procedure; torts; property; contracts; criminal law (one semester); and legal
research and writing. This group is taught by core first-year faculty
who meet on a weekly basis to coordinate substantive course coverage, research and writing problems, outside reading assignments,
small group exercises, team teaching possibilities, and guest speakers.
In form and basic coverage, each "traditional" course still exists as it
does in the remainder of the first-year sections - that is, as a discrete
and coherent whole taught by a single faculty member in that discipline. The major difference, as the curriculum's name suggests, lies in
the faculty members' shared goal of illuminating for students the doctrinal and other interconnections among subjects which first-year students are usually told are separate and disconnected domains of
knowledge. The "Coordinated Curriculum" model offers myriad possibilities for innovation in and improvement on the traditional firstyear model, while avoiding some of the pitfalls inherent in a complete
reconstruction. 30 A few such options are mentioned below.
Vol. 3, No. 3
(June 1993), p. 1 and Vol. 4, No. 2 (January 1994), p. 1.
Among the law schools which presently feature experimental first-year programs are
the City University of New York School of Law at Queens College (CUNY), the University of Maryland Law School, and New York University School of Law.
30 Like many another critic of the standard first-year curriculum, I confess to considerable doubts about the possible merits of its complete discontinuance and replacement, especially on a school-by-school experimental basis. In addition to the fact that the
traditional curriculum has a number of attributes which should be preserved, wholesale
restructuring itself may present problems. On a practical level, especially at non-elite law
schools, such fundamental revamping on a piecemeal basis may further exacerbate the very
real and legitimate anxieties of students already concerned about their prospects for passNEWSLETrER OF THE INTERUNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM ON POVERTY LAW,
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One benefit of such an approach is perhaps best expressed by the
adage that a whole actually can be greater than the sum of its parts.
Especially in the context of the strong (and to some extent inevitable)
stress and pressure of the first year, students seem genuinely to appreciate the faculty team effort and ingenuity involved in identifying
cross-cutting issues, themes, and cases in a diverse array of materials.
The curriculum demands a considerable amount of intellectual energy
and collaboration from students as well - a learning process from
which students can reap as much as they sow.
A second attribute lies in the curriculum's illustration-in-microcosm of the complexity of any given case. By cross-referencing both
our substantive materials and our pedagogical approaches to a particular problem, we hope to teach students that doctrine and practice are
not self-contained but intertwined, and that each client consultation
has the potential to present aspects of both for analysis. For example,
any given "legal problem" of a client may present them with property
and contract issues, or tort and criminal implications, as well as the
procedural questions. which must be answered for the problem to
move toward resolution.
A third contribution of a "coordinated" curriculum - one of particular pertinence to the concerns of this essay - is the enhanced opportunity presented for the introduction of diversity issues across a
range of courses sequentially or even simultaneously. Raising difficult
issues of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, and other cultural differences is often a thorny and tense enterprise, particularly for
the beginning teacher working in isolation from her colleagues. Law
students are frequently less than receptive to the new teacher (and
teaching style) perceived as radically different from their institution's
"norm," and the experimental teacher herself may be rendered less
effective and less self-confident by a lack of collegial support for and
feedback on her ideas. Extensive and honest collaboration across the
curriculum is a partial antidote for such pitfalls. It serves as both reality-check and morale-booster. Moreover, a primary lesson of diversity
in education in itself is the greater collective wisdom to be derived
from the interaction of multiple perspectives, backgrounds, and experiences. One effective way of conveying this lesson subtly yet directly
to students is to construct an educational environment in which learning the bar exam, securing employment, and gaining some measure of professional esteem
in their communities. Without broad support both from within a particular law school
community and from the profession at large, such experiments may in fact leave students
feeling less prepared rather than more prepared for the world which lies beyond graduation.
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ing occurs through communication with teachers of diverse strengths
and skills.
In our case, such diversity was incorporated into both individual
courses and "cross-cutting" exercises which involved various possible
intersections of torts, civil procedure, contracts, property, criminal
law, and legal research and writing. As an instructor of a first-year
course, I have found it particularly beneficial to teach students "the
politics of procedure" in a multidimensional context which draws
upon both the substantive implications of procedure in litigation and
the dynamics of lawyer-client and lawyer-community interaction so
frequently ignored in first-year (and indeed, most non-clinical)
courses. Numerous students have reported as well the sense of satisfaction they experience when they learn to approach complex crosscutting issues and exercises not as abstract and arcane law school hypotheticals about The Black Letter Law of One Subject, but rather as
examples of the kinds of cases they are likely to encounter in legal
practice. Students benefit further when they have the usually all-toorare opportunity to engage in discussion of such issues with a cluster
of teachers from different subject areas rather than just one professor.
Finally, the "coordinated" arrangement frees up numerous possibilities for more effective and flexible time allocation. Often, an instructor working alone may feel severe time constraints in making
sure that adequate doctrinal coverage is accomplished in the three
units typically allotted to each semester of a first-year course. Given
such pressures, it is often difficult for any individual teacher to conceive of departing too far from a prepared course syllabus and
"script," thus compounding with fear and inertia the deficiencies of an
already too convention-bound approach to first-year education. By
devising team-teaching exercises, sharing class hours, and interweaving selected readingg across several courses, the teachers in our curriculum have maximized opportunities for "expanding" the boundaries
of each course without unduly burdening any one in particular.
I briefly describe below three coordinated curriculum exercises
with which we experimented over the period of one academic year,
and evaluate the overall usefulness of each with respect to our longterm curricular goals and strategies. As the particulars of these examples illustrate, each was tailored to address a specific point on the
(more or less) typical first-year "learning curve"; moreover, each was
designed to convey to the students not only (and even not primarily)
the substantive law in the areas from which we drew, but also a set of
lawyering processes for them to carry throughout their educational
and professional careers.
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ConstructingA Case: An Analysis Of Deshaney v. Winnebago
County And the Affirmative Duty to Act (Civil Procedure,
Torts, Criminal Law)

Approximately three weeks into the first semester, the entire coordinated curriculum met for two class sessions to discuss a set of
materials focusing on the tort concept of -the "affirmative duty to act"
in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services,31 in which the Court rejected a Due Process challenge brought by a severely abused child and
his mother against a state agency which had failed to take action
against the child's violent father even though it had had some knowledge of the father's previous abuse of the child. At this early point in
the school year, we designed the DeShaney exercise with the following
major objectives: (1) to begin to "unpack" the often overwhelmingly
dense thicket of appellate cases in first-year courses by showing how
one particular Supreme Court case originated from a very painful
human dispute involving child abuse, family dissolution, and administrative neglect; (2) to examine and question the choices among civil
and criminal law alternatives from which such lawsuits arise; and (3)
to encourage students to view substantive doctrinal concepts such as
the "affirmative duty to act" in the broader context of public policy,
education, and constitutional law. Accordingly, the exercise proceeded as follows.
Before the first class session, we distributed a handout containing
only a bare recitation of the "facts" in DeShaney, and a few unrelated
cases on the "affirmative duty to act" concept in other contexts. Students were asked to think about what strategies (civil and criminal,
litigative and otherwise) they would recommend to address and ameliorate young Joshua DeShaney's situation if they were representing
his legal interests. Students were given no indication that these facts
constituted a "case" which had reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but
rather were asked to think broadly and freely about the rights of children in predicaments similar to Joshua's, as well as about the usefulness of the legal system in assisting such individuals.
Three teachers led discussion at the first class session. First, the
criminal law professor discussed the role of the criminal law in deterring and/or punishing abusive parents; although the case of DeShaney
did not focus on such issues, the original facts of Joshua DeShaney's
mistreatment necessarily turned on an analysis and consideration of
parental criminal conduct. Second, I (as the civil procedure instructor) invited students to craft a complaint on Joshua and his mother's
31 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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behalf from the facts which they had been given and to consider how
such a pleading might be written to withstand a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim; this led to a brief discussion of the discovery
process as well. Finally, the torts instructor provided a transition from
the more "technical" and procedural aspects of the discussion to the
substantive legal issues raised by the argument that under some circumstances a state may have an affirmative duty to intervene in cases
such as Joshua's. At the end of the class, students were given the U.S.
Supreme Court opinion in DeShaney and asked to read it for the next
session.
In session two, several of the instructors led a discussion of the
DeShaney decision itself, followed by the playing of a tape-recording
of the oral argument before the Court. A final component of the exercise again moved the facts of DeShaney away from the litigation
context and into a discussion of the public policy implications of finding an "affirmative duty to act" on the part of social services agencies
as a strategy for addressing child abuse. Would such a result increase
or decrease the likelihood that agencies would investigate and document complaints? Is litigation the best or even an appropriate vehicle
for the resolution of such tragedies as Joshua's?
In retrospect, a mere two sessions seemed barely adequate to address these complex questions; certainly, even more clinically-oriented
strategies (e.g., structuring an opportunity for the class to interview or
critique a simulated interview of Joshua's mother) might be added to
this exercise to enhance further its pedagogical effectiveness. Still,
judging from the enthusiasm and sophistication of much of the student
participation in this exercise, students were effectively learning quite
early in their law school careers that the seemingly two-dimensional
cases over which they labored so intensively in fact sprang from multifaceted underpinnings.
B.

Small Group Work: The Problem Of Racial Harassment In
Rental Housing (Property, Contracts, Torts, Civil
Procedure)
Shortly before the end of the first semester, we conducted a
lengthier and more complex exercise which required students to work
in small groups before meeting with their instructors for core group
discussions of the assigned problems. The basic fact pattern (based on
a local case which one of the professors had litigated) involved tort,
contract, civil procedure, and property issues arising from a white
landlord's failure to respond adequately to complaints of racial harassment lodged by her two African-American tenants against a family of
white tenants. To resolve these problems, students were asked to
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meet several times on their own with their small group; each group
was then assigned to meet with an individual instructor to discuss their
results. The primary benefit envisioned through this exercise was to
illustrate the collective nature of lawyering and legal problem-solving.
Fortunately, by the end of the first semester, many students were already working together in small groups; the coordinated curriculum's
"official" recognition of the value of such collective activity seemed to
encourage students further in this regard.
C.

A Cross-Over "Live Final Exam" Exercise: Sexual Harassment
Grievance Alternatives (Torts [Statutory Analysis], Civil
Procedure And Contracts)

At the very end of the school year, we designed a kind of "live
final exam" exercise (ungraded) intended both to improve students'
test-taking skills in analyzing hypotheticals and to underscore to them
the importance in legal practice of a creative, cross-cutting approach
to problem-solving.
In advance of the "live exam session" featuring all of the firstyear instructors in the coordinated curriculum, students were given
the following facts:
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to provide that in
cases of sexual harassment, plaintiffs can recover (1) punitive damages if the employer acted with "malice or reckless indifference" to
the plaintiff's rights; and (2) compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pecuniary losses, subject to varying caps of $50,000 to $300,000, depending upon the
number of workers employed by the defendant. In cases in which
plaintiffs seek compensatory or punitive damages, trial by jury is
available.
Shortly after the Act became effective, the XYZ Corporation of
California required all of its employees to sign employment agreements setting forth the terms and conditions of employment. One
of the provisions required all employee disputes, claims, and grievances to be subject to binding arbitration.
Sally Forth, an XYZ employee who had recently been selected for a
special project, signed the arbitration agreement as part of the contract committing her to the two-year project. Sally did not consider
objecting to the provision because she did not believe that XYZ
would change it. When Sally reported for training, she was assigned
to Larry, a senior employee in the division. During the training,
Larry commented on the neckline of Sally's blouses, her attractive
legs, and "how much better she looked in dresses than slacks."
Larry also repeatedly asked Sally to lunch, suggesting with a wink
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that "just the two of them" drive to a restaurant at a local motel.
Sally refused. After the first few incidents, Sally complained to her
supervisor. He suggested that Larry was just like that, and that
Sally was making a big deal out of nothing.
Sally became very upset about what she considered to be clear sexual harassment by Larry. However, she did not know what to do.
She noticed an ad in the local town newspaper which asked any
female employees who were having problems with sexual harassment to join a proposed organization to combat sexual harassment
in the workplace. The ad led to a fair amount of discussion in the
community and a series of letters to the editor both pro and con.
Sally joined the organization and became one of its principal
spokespersons.
Larry became quite irritated both because Sally had rebuffed his
advances and because she had become involved in the sexual harassment organization. He decided as a joke to embarrass her by
writing on the men's room wall, "She lousy at work but for a good
time call Sally at 777-7777" (this was Sally's telephone number).
For several weeks, Sally received calls at home at all hours of the
night. Many of the calls were quite obscene. Finally, Sally discovered that the calls had originated from the message on the bathroom wall and she demanded that her employer remove the writing
(which he did). Larry admitted that he had written the message but
asserted that it was just a joke and she ought to "get a sense of
humor."
Sally's next evaluation was substantially lower than her previous
ones and when she inquired, Sally found out that Larry had reported that her progress in the training was substantially below par.
Sally admits that Larry's behavior made it difficult for her to perform up to her previously high standards. Sally has come to your
law firm for advice. Her first preference would be to quit, but she is
worried about breaching her two-year commitment to XYZ. She
informs you that a number of other employees have complained
about Larry's behavior as well, and that she, Larry, and the supervisor are all residents of California. The senior partner in the firm has
divided up the work and asked you to address the following questions:
COORDINATED DISCUSSION: Consider Sally's options. If she
wants to pursue a sexual harassment claim, what are the different
ways in which she can bring such charges? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of the different forums?
CONTRACTS: (1) Leaving aside any issues that arise under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, is the employment agreement that Sally
signed an enforceable contract? (2) If Sally quits before the two-
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year project is completed, will XYZ have a cause of action for
breach of contract?
TORTS / STATUTORY ANALYSIS: Discuss any rights and remedies you believe that Sally may have against the company and her
chances of prevailing on each. In particular, you should consider:
(1) Whether the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act might
affect the arbitration agreement. What additional information
might you need to address this issue? (2) If the arbitration agreement is invalid, what rights does Sally have against Larry and/or the
company?
CIVIL PROCEDURE: (1) Assume that Sally files suit in federal
court under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and that controlling authority holds that, under the Civil Rights Act, Sally may sue only
the company, and may not sue Larry and the supervisor individually. Devise a strategy to bring Larry and the supervisor into the
litigation. (2) Would you advise Sally to seek class certification to
challenge the enforceability of the binding arbitration clause?
Although our group of "coordinated" instructors decided to test
in a "non-coordinated" way - that is, with each final exam focusing
only on material covered in that substantive course - we also felt that
our final exercise with the students should reflect the goals of coordination, clinical emphasis, and diversity with which we had begun the
year's efforts. Accordingly, our strategy for this final session was twofold: first, to address students' quite understandable concerns with
enhancing their test-taking skills by giving them some general advice
about legal analysis in the context of a three-hour examination; and
second, to elicit their discussion of the significant legal, ethical, and
pragmatic issues involved in representing a client who had been sexually harassed. Thus, it was and is our hope that as students leave the
coordinated curriculum and progress through their remaining years of
law school, they will remember the eclectic process through which
they were initially exposed to so-called Black Letter Law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Now that our first few years of experimentation have worked
through a number of minor drawbacks and flaws, there is much more
that can be done to explore even further the applicability of clinical
theory and practice to our classroom work.3 2 Critical to this next step,
32 1 am particularly grateful to have had the opportunity to work with the faculty who
participated in the coordinated curriculum during the 1992 - 1993 and 1993 - 1994 school
years: Margalynne Armstrong, June Carbone, David Hoffman, Carol Koenig, Ellen
Kreitzberg, Samara Marion, Nancy Millich, John Rumel. Carol Sanger. Ed Steinman, and

Eric Wright.
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.in my view, is the active collaboration of both non-clinicians and clinicians. As "beginners," in a sense, teachers of core curriculum doctrinal
courses have only now started to ask and to live "the questions themselves" about the need for serious reform in the first-year mainstream
curriculum. Without the ideas, criticism, and help of colleagues only
superficially across the "Divide," we will founder seriously in our
shared attempts to bridge the gaps among doctrine, theory, and practice.
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